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ABSTRACT
Both investors and borrowers are concerned about liquidity. Investors desire liquidity because they
are uncertain about when they will want to eliminate their holding of a financial asset.  Borrowers are
concerned about liquidity because they are uncertain about their ability to continue to attract or retain
funding. Because borrowers  typically cannot repay investors on demand, investors will require a premium
or significant control rights when they lend to borrowers directly, as compensation for the illiquidity
investors will be subject to. We argue that banks can resolve these liquidity problems  that arise in direct
lending. Banks enable depositors to withdraw at low cost, as  well as buffer firms from the liquidity needs
of their investors. We show the bank has to have a fragile capital structure, subject to bank runs, in order
to perform these functions.  Far from being an aberration to be regulated away, the funding of illiquid loans
by a bank with volatile demand deposits is rationalized in the context of the functions it performs. This
model can be used to investigate important issues such  as narrow banking and bank capital requirements.
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Banks perform valuable activities on either side of their balance sheets. On the asset side,
they make loans to difficult, illiquid borrowers, thus enhancing the flow of credit in the economy.
On the liability side, they provide liquidity on demand to depositors. We know from Diamond
and Dybvig [1983] that banks can transform illiquid assets into more liquid demand deposits.
But there seems to be a fundamental incompatibility between the two activities -- the demands
for liquidity by depositors may arrive at an inconvenient time and force the fire-sale liquidation
of illiquid assets. Furthermore, because depositors are served in sequence, the prospect of fire
sales may precipitate self-fulfilling runs that further jeopardize bank activities. In country after
country, an army of regulators supervises banks to protect them from their own fragility. And
after every banking crisis, economists point to how risky the combination of bank activities is,
and how it makes sense to legislate the separation of banking activities. But is there logic,
hitherto unnoticed, for the bank's choice of activities?    Is financial fragility a desirable
characteristic of banks?
Our paper suggests yes. Assets are illiquid in our framework because the best users of
the asset cannot commit to employ their specialized human capital on behalf of others. So, for
example, an entrepreneur with a project can threaten to quit at an interim stage. This gives him
bargaining power over the surplus generated, no matter what contract he signs at the outset with
financiers, hence he cannot promise to pay out surplus fully.  Thus real assets are illiquid.  They
cannot be sold or borrowed against for the full value they generate due to this limited ability to
commit.
Of course, lenders can be given control rights such as the right to seize assets and put
them to alternative use (i.e., liquidate). This will give them some bargaining power over the
surplus that the entrepreneur generates. Also, as a lender sees the entrepreneur's  modus operandi
over the course of the financing relationship , she will understand the entrepreneur's business
better and thus will be able to liquidate assets for more.  So is illiquidity no longer an issue if a2
lender develops specific skills over the course of the relationship that give her a sufficiently
strong liquidation threat to extract full repayment?
The answer is no if the "relationship" lender is likely to face a need for liquidity. After
having made the loan, the lender may need money for a new business or for consumption and she
may not be able to raise money elsewhere to finance this need. She will have to sell the loan, or
use it as collateral, to raise money to meet either of these liquidity needs. The amount raised will
be unavoidably low if her specific ability to collect future loan payments from the entrepreneur is
lost when she undertakes the opportunity. Even if her loan collection skills persist after she
undertakes the new business or consumption opportunity, there is a potential problem.  Because
she typically cannot commit to using her skills to extract repayment from the entrepreneur on
behalf of others, her loan to the entrepreneur is illiquid -- she cannot sell it or raise money against
it to the full value of the repayment she expects to extract from the entrepreneur.
The lender’s inability to sell, or borrow against, a loan for the full present value of what
she could extract in the future, when faced with a need for liquidity, affects the initial terms of
her loan, and her interactions with the entrepreneur.  Even though the loan is riskless when held
to maturity, its low sale price makes it risky for one with potential liquidity needs. Since the loan
does not repay much when she has the highest use for money, the lender may demand a premium
from the entrepreneur, and may incorporate contractual terms that allow her to liquidate the
entrepreneur's project when she is in need of liquidity. Thus the lender's need for liquidity creates
liquidity risk for the entrepreneur, and the lender may even refuse to lend if her likelihood of
having a liquidity need is high enough.
The adverse consequences of illiquidity could be avoided if a relationship lender with
persistent loan collection skills could borrow the full value of the loan to the entrepreneur when
she faces a need for liquidity.  She can do this only if she can commit to deploy her extraction
skills for free in the future on behalf of the new lender(s). One way to commit is for the3
relationship lender to borrow using demand deposits: a fragile capital structure that is subject to a
“run”.  If the relationship lender threatens to withdraw her specific collection skills as a ploy to
get more rents, she will precipitate a run by depositors, which will drive her rents to zero. Fearing
this outcome, she will not attempt to renegotiate any pre-committed payments, and will be able to
pass through to depositors all that she extracts from the entrepreneur. So the fragility of her
capital structure enables the relationship lender to borrow against the full value of the illiquid
loan she holds. This then enables her to lend up front without demanding an expected return
premium for illiquidity, and without liquidating the entrepreneur when faced with a liquidity
shock.  Financial fragility allows liquidity creation.
More generally, we can extend this idea to explain financial intermediaries such as
banks. Suppose no single lender has the wealth to fully finance an entrepreneur's project. If
lenders have to club their money together, it makes sense for one of them to become an
intermediary whom we shall call the banker. The banker can issue demand deposits to the other
lenders. The fragile deposit structure allows persistent relationship building to be delegated to
the banker (much as in Diamond [1984] where the intermediary monitors on behalf of investors),
because the banker can commit to pay depositors what she can extract from the entrepreneur
based on her specific loan collection skills. If initial depositors have liquidity needs at an interim
stage, the banker can refinance by issuing fresh demand deposits and can thus meet their needs.
New depositors will be willing to replace old depositors who withdraw since new depositors will
be confident the bank will repay. As a result, the bank’s deposits are a desirable asset for
investors who have need for liquidity, and are liquid even though loans made by the bank are
illiquid. Moreover, the bank shields entrepreneurs from the liquidity needs of depositors, thus
creating liquidity on both sides of the balance sheet.
The rest of the paper is as follows. We present the framework in section I, and derive the
nature of the optimal financing contract in section II. In section III we explain how a bank can4
achieve the second best outcome.  Our model has a number of implications which we explore in
section IV, we relate the paper to the literature in section V, especially Diamond and Dybvig
[1983] and Calomiris and Kahn [1991], and we conclude with a description of some of the many
extensions that are possible to this model.
I. The Framework.
A. Projects.
Consider an economy with entrepreneurs and potential financiers.  The economy lasts for two
periods and three dates -- date 0 to date 2.  All agents have linear utility of consumption. Each
entrepreneur has a project, which lasts for two periods. The project requires an investment of up
to $1 at date 0.  If an entrepreneur works on his project, it produces a riskless cash flow of  Ct at
date t (all amounts are per dollar invested).  Investment in the project is observable and
contractible—the entrepreneur cannot divert the funds to another use. There is also a storage
opportunity that returns $1 for every dollar invested.
B. Financing.
Entrepreneurs do not have money to finance their projects. There are many potential
financiers with an endowment of one unit at date 0, and arbitrarily many other financiers with
smaller endowments at each date. The exact distribution of endowment is not critical.
The entrepreneur can raise money by issuing contracts (which for convenience only we
will call loans). We assume very little about the form of the contract other than there is a
required payment on particular date(s) and the lender gets control rights over the asset if the
entrepreneur defaults. This specification subsumes a contract where the lender always has
control rights since that is obtained by setting the required payment to  ¥. So, a contract only
specifies repayments P t that the borrower is required to make at date t (with repayments possibly
contingent on the liquidity shock to the lender that we will shortly describe).5
C. Relationship Lending.
The date-0 lender to a project, whom we will call the relationship lender, develops
specific skills in identifying the liquidation value of the assets -- she has been in a relationship
with the entrepreneur at an early enough stage to know how the business was built, knows which
markets personnel were hired from and where assets were bought, and knows what alternative
strategies were considered.  So she can identify the second best use(r) of the asset more precisely
than anyone else. Formally, before date t, she can take the asset away from the entrepreneur and
put it in alternative use to generate a present value  Xt. This is the “liquidation value” of the
assets. After date 2, the liquidation value collapses to zero. There is symmetric information about
cash flows and liquidation values.
Because other lenders who come in later do not have her specific skills in finding the
next best alternative use, they can generate only  bXt where 0£b<1 from the asset.  Since
educating the initial lender takes time and effort, we assume that an entrepreneur can borrow
from only one such lender.
1 We will discuss various other interpretations of the relationship
lender's skills later.
D. Limited Commitment.
There are two limitations on the willingness of financiers to lend. First, at any date an
agent can commit to work on the specific venture only  for that date (as in Hart and Moore [1994]
and Hart [1995]) – the law prevents him from irrevocably selling himself into bondage. This
implies that after borrowing and investing at date 0, the entrepreneur could threaten to quit
before cash flows are due to be produced at date 1 unless the terms of financing are renegotiated.
He can do this again before date 2. Similarly, the relationship lender cannot commit to others that
she will use her specific skills on their behalf at any future date.
This implies that loans can be renegotiated.  For simplicity, we assume that the
entrepreneur has all the bargaining power; if the entrepreneur defaults on a scheduled payment,6
he can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer with a revised menu of payments, and can commit not to
work for that period if an impasse is reached.  We show later that our qualitative results hold
when the lender has some additional bargaining power.  If the lender accepts the revised
schedule, the entrepreneur produces that date’s cash flow, makes the spot payment required by
the revised schedule, and continues in possession of the asset.  If the lender rejects the revised
schedule, the cash flow is not produced that period; the lender takes possession of the asset and
does as she chooses with it  (see Figures 1 and 2).
E. Liquidity Shock.
The second limitation on the willingness to lend up front is that with probability  q at date
1, the relationship lender could get a liquidity shock -- a highly valued investment or
consumption opportunity -- which makes her impatient (we denote this type of lender by
superscript I). The shock increases her personal rate of time preference, making one unit of date-
1 goods worth R units of date-2 goods to her. We refer to a lender who does not get a liquidity
shock as patient or ~I.  We assume that the realization of the liquidity shock is the relationship
lender’s own private information – outsiders have no way to find out how strong her desire to
consume is, or how good the investment opportunity really is.  This specification of liquidity
shocks is similar to that in Bryant [1980] and Diamond and Dybvig [1983], but without the
introduction of risk aversion.
Apart from those who get the liquidity shock described above, no one discounts future
consumption: the discount rate is zero. We assume endowments are sufficiently large relative to
projects, and there are enough investors who do not get a liquidity shock that storage is always in
use at the margin at each date. So there is no aggregate shortage of liquidity of the type in
Diamond [1997], and at any date a claim on one unit of consumption at date t+1 sells in the
market for one unit at date t.
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 The banker’s specific skills in our model resemble the relationship specific information bankers get in
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Assumption A1 indicate the project produces greater returns,  C1+C2, viewed from both the date 0
investment and the date 1 opportunity cost of  X1, than the relationship lender’s discount rate,
even when hit with a liquidity shock. This ensures that it is always efficient for the entrepreneur
to continue his project. A2 indicates the project is worth continuing at date 2.  Condition A3
ensures that the project can be financed if the lender does not suffer liquidity shocks, because it
will turn out that entrepreneur can commit to pay the relationship lender an amount equal to X 1 at
date 1 or X2 at date 2, the liquidation value of his assets.
The time line of events thus far is:
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2
1. Entrepreneur offers loan
terms to lender.
2. Loan is made if lender
accepts.
3. Amount invested.
4. Lender acquires specific
expertise in liquidation
through the relationship.
1. Lender suffers (or does not
suffer) a private liquidity
shock.
2. Entrepreneur makes any
required payment or offers
alternative schedule.
3. If alternative schedule
offered, lender accepts or
takes possession of asset.
4. Loan may be sold to
another lender.
1. Entrepreneur makes any
required payment or offers
alternative schedule.
2. If alternative schedule
offered, lender accepts or
takes possession of asset.
II. Optimal Contracts.
The amount invested in each project can be anywhere between 0 and 1. It turns out that
in this world of certainty, the entrepreneur will always optimally invest everything he raises at
date 0, and not store any cash.
2 If the lender finds the terms acceptable for any specific amount
                                                           
2  The contract space is rich enough that the entrepreneur does not need to store cash to protect  himself
against unnecessary liquidation by the lender. Moreover, the entrepreneur's incentive to protect himself8
raised, linearity implies she will find them acceptable (suitably scaled) for any other amount.
Taken together, this implies that we can focus, without loss of generality, at situations where the
entrepreneur borrows $1 and invests it entirely in the project.
A. The Entrepreneur's Optimization Problem.
In offering to borrow using a particular loan contract up front, the entrepreneur wants to
maximize his expected payoffs. If it is to be rational for the relationship lender to make the loan
at date 0, she should expect to get at least  (1)R qq -+ , which is her expected utility, given the
probability of a liquidity shock, using her alternative of storage. Because there is no shortage of
funds at date 0, we assume the entrepreneur can borrow by matching the expected utility from
this outside option of storage.  We now examine the optimal outcomes given the limits of the
entrepreneur’s ability to commit to payments derived above. Two principles are clear:
(a)  Because the returns from continuation exceed R, the entrepreneur would like to ensure
that his project does not get liquidated unless this is absolutely necessary for the lender to make
the loan – unless liquidation is the only way to satisfy the lender’s Individual Rationality (IR)
constraint.
(b)  Since the entrepreneur values cash flows the same in either state and at either date
(because his discount factor is 1), he would like to commit up front to give the relationship
lender as much as possible at date 1 when she is impatient and needs liquidity. Define the
illiquidity premium as the increase in expected payments the entrepreneur has to make over and
above the expected payments the lender would receive if she had invested in storage at date 0
(which pays $1 for sure at date 1 regardless of the lender’s type). Then the illiquidity premium is
3
(1)[1    Date-1 cash flow to impatient lender ] R q -- ( 1 )
                                                                                                                                                                                 
against necessary liquidation by holding cash can be dealt with by setting the date-1 payment high enough.
3 Let V be the expected payment in all other states and V 1
I be the Date-1 cash flow to the impatient lender.
The illiquidity premium is  1 1
I VV q +- . For the lender to lend,  1 (1)
I VRVR qqq +=-+ . Solving for
V, substituting in the illiquidity premium and rearranging, we get the simplified expression.9
where  q is the probability of the lender getting the liquidity shock and the cash flow to the
impatient lender includes any payments by the entrepreneur, and any proceeds from loan sale or
project liquidation. We call an asset with  a zero illiquidity premium "liquid". An asset with a
positive illiquidity premium is one where more is paid in expectation over time to the holder
because it does not pay as much when she is impatient at date 1 as storage. Thus a relationship
lender is willing to pay less at date 0 for such an asset than the present value of its future
repayments discounted at the gross market interest rate (of 1). It is "illiquid". Moreover, we will
see that the reason for the illiquidity premium is that the impatient relationship lender will realize
less from the loan at date 1 than the present value of payoffs if she held the loan to maturity and
discounted at the market interest rate. Relationship  loans can be an unbreakable bundle of  state
contingent claims (in states where lender  type differs). Thus a loan is illiquid because it has poor
state contingent payoffs, and it has poor state contingent payoffs because it cannot fetch as much
in times of need as the present value of what the holder could realize if she did not have the need.
Finally, note that if the amount that an impatient lender can realize at date 1 exceeds 1
(and consequently the total payment to a patient lender is less than 1), the loan provides the
lender liquidity insurance.   In this case, the expected return premium required is negative (i.e.,
the loan has a lower expected return than a liquid asset).  We will see that because the need for
liquidity is private information, no such “more than liquid” asset exists.
Taking (a) and (b) together, the entrepreneur’s first priority in the contract he offers is to
minimize the probability of liquidation, following which he will focus on reducing the illiquidity
premium by ensuring the contract pays the maximum possible to the lender if she turns out to be
impatient at date 1.  We will show in a wide variety of circumstances that the loan from the
relationship lender to the entrepreneur will be illiquid because of their inability to commit their
specific skills to others.
B. Contract Renegotiation.10
There are limitations on how much the entrepreneur can commit to pay because he can
always threaten to quit and thus bargain his payments down. Let us describe what happens when
a contract is renegotiated.  Suppose  that at date 2, the loan has not been previously sold.  The
entrepreneur has to renegotiate with the relationship lender.  The entrepreneur may refuse to
make the pre-specified payment  P2 and, instead, may make an offer of a lower payment. In
response, the relationship lender can accept the offer or reject it and liquidate the assets to  obtain
X2 (see figure 1).  Thus if  P2 exceeds  X2, the entrepreneur will renegotiate knowing that the
lender will be satisfied with an offer of  X2. Thus at date 2 the entrepreneur will
pay 22 {,} MinPX.
Now consider what happens at date 1 if the relationship lender is patient (i.e., has not
received a liquidity shock). If the entrepreneur initiates re-negotiation, the lender can accept the
entrepreneur's offer.  Alternatively she can liquidate and get  X1, or hold on to the asset and get  X2
at date 2 (see figure 2).  Since the relationship lender has the best extraction skills, selling when
patient is a weakly dominated option. So she will accept any offer that makes payments
amounting to  12 {,} MaxXX over dates 1 and 2 where any payment left for date 2 should be
enforceable, i.e., should be less than  X2.  If the promised payments P 1 + P 2 exceed
12 {,} MaxXX, they will be renegotiated down to this level (note that if a state contingent
contract had been written, P1 and P2 would be the payments given the relationship lender has no
need for liquidity).
Suppose, instead, the lender does receive a liquidity shock at date 1 and becomes
impatient.  If the borrower attempts to renegotiate, the lender can liquidate the asset and get  X1,
or get a present value of 
2 X
R
 by waiting till date 2.
There is another option. A number of potential lenders at date 1 have endowments but
have not received a liquidity shock. So they can substitute for the relationship lender, albeit11
imperfectly because they do not have her specific skills. So a third option for the relationship
lender is to sell the loan contract at date 1 to an unskilled lender who has not suffered a shock.
All claims and rights of the initial lender pass on to the loan buyer. Let  S be the maximum that
the loan buyer can collect on the loan at date 2. For now, we take S as exogenous.  We discuss its
determination in section II.D, below.   Since the buyer will be from the large pool of lenders who
have not suffered a liquidity shock, and since the prevailing interest rate is zero, he will be
willing to buy the claim at date 1 for what he expects to recover from the loan at date 2, i.e.,  S.
Since at most X2 can be recovered from the entrepreneur at date 2,  2 SX £ .
In summary, the maximum date-1 present value the impatient relationship lender can






=  while the
maximum amount she can extract if patient is 
~
12 {,}
I EMaxXX = .
C.  Optimal financial arrangements and the consequences of illiquid loans
The next question is how much can actually be paid to the relationship lender at date 1,
i.e., what is the cash or liquidity available for her to consume or invest elsewhere?  The
maximum the lender can get at date 1 if she does not liquidate is if she collects all the date 1 cash
flow generated by the entrepreneur, and she sells date-2 promised payments for the maximum
they could fetch. In this case, she can get up to 1 CS + . She will get, at maximum,  C1 if the loan
is not sold and the project not liquidated. If she liquidates the project, she can be paid  1 X .
These limits on extractability and liquidity bound the maximum possible payments by
the entrepreneur. If it is possible for him to offer a contract to the relationship lender with terms
contingent on the realization of the lender’s date-1 liquidity need, then these limits can be
achieved. Even so, as Lemma 1 indicates, the entrepreneur may be forced to pay liquidity  premia
or be liquidated solely to meet the needs of the lender.12
Lemma 1: If the initial loan contract between the entrepreneur and the relationship lender can
be directly contingent on the relationship lender's type (i.e., contingent on whether she receives a
liquidity shock or not)
(i)  The entrepreneur will be financed at date 0 and will provide the lender liquidity
insurance, with the loan carrying a negative illiquidity premium, if
1 {,}1
I MinCSE +> .
(ii)  The entrepreneur will be financed at date 0 and the loan will be a liquid asset with a
zero illiquidity premium if  1 {,}1
I MinCSE += .
If   1 {,}1
I MinCSE +<
(iii)  The entrepreneur will be financed at date 0 but the loan will be illiquid and he will have
to pay a positive illiquidity premium if either
1
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(iv)  If none of (3), (4), or (5) hold, the entrepreneur will be financed at date 0 but only with











(v)  The entrepreneur will not be financed at all at date 0 otherwise.
Proof :13
Consider the mechanism design problem the entrepreneur faces, keeping in mind that the
contract can be renegotiated at date 1 after the lender's liquidity needs are determined (her type is
revealed).  We characterize the contract in terms of the payments it draws forth from the
entrepreneur. Define 
j
t V as the cash paid by an entrepreneur when the relationship lender is of
type j (where  {,~} jII ˛ ) at date t. We can restrict attention to renegotiation-proof contracts,
where the entrepreneur can and will make the payment 
j
t V . The entrepreneur’s goal is to
maximize  F w.r.t. 
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Payments renegotiation-proof and individually rational:
111 [, C]
j VMaxX £                         ( maximum feasible date-1 payment  )
~
22
I VX £                                         ( maximum date-2 payment enforceable by type ~I)
If the date 2 portion of the loan, 
I 
2 V , is sold at date 1 by type I (impatient), then
2  
I VS £                   (maximum date-2 payment enforceable by buyer)
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If the date 2 portion of the loan, 
I 
2 V , is kept at date 1 by type I (impatient), then
1212  [,] 
II VRVMaxXRX +£                   (maximum total payment enforceable)
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Contingent payments other than at date 1 to the impatient lender enter the objective function and
the Individual Rationality (IR) constraints in the same way, and all combinations that satisfy the14
IR constraint are equally good, so long as there is no liquidation. The conditions in the lemma
follow simply by substituting the maximum feasible date-1 payment to the impatient lender into
the IR condition, and solving for the required payment to the patient lender. So long as that
payment can be extracted, it will be made -- since the patient lender is indifferent between
payments at either date, the timing of cash payments is not relevant.
The optimal contract will have the impatient lender always selling the loan at date 1 if
the IR constraint can be satisfied when she does so, for this minimizes the illiquidity premium.
However, the required payments to the patient lender may be so high that they cannot be
extracted. There are two possibilities left. Since the relationship lender can extract more than the
loan buyer, it may be necessary for her to keep the loan even when impatient instead of selling it,
and extract enough to meet her IR constraint. Of course, she has to extract enough to compensate
for the higher illiquidity premium she will now need.  Condition (4) ensures this is feasible. If
not, the entrepreneur may be able to borrow by allowing himself to be liquidated if the lender
suffers a shock (see Lemma I (iv)). This can reduce the required payment to the patient lender to
an extractable level. If not, it is not individually rational for the lender to make the loan in the
first place (Lemma I (v)). Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 shows the loan may have an illiquidity premium and liquidation may arise even
when the lender's liquidity need can be directly contracted on.
4  However, unlike what is assumed
in Lemma 1, the lender’s liquidity need is private information. Therefore, the best the
entrepreneur can do is to offer a contract that has a menu of possibilities at date 1, and allow the
                                                           
4 If liquidity needs were verifiable, were not an aggregate risk, and if agents other then the entrepreneur
have no limit on commitment to pay, both storage and the loan payments could be transformed into type-
contingent insurance contracts.  For example, the lender could store, and sell off the payment of 1 in states
where she does not get a liquidity shock in return for additional payments when she does get a liquidity
shock.  In this case, the lender’s outside option is 
~~ 1
1122 , 0
IIII VVVV q ==== .  Unless the loan offers
at least the same possibilities, i.e., unless it offers at least a payment of 1 that can either be consumed at date
1 or can be assigned to others in states when the lender is not in need of liquidity, it will require a premium
expected return. Thus the condition for the loan to be illiquid (and the entrepreneur not liquidated)
remains 1 {,}1
I MinCSE +< .15
lender to select her preferred option based on her type. This will introduce additional self-
selection restrictions on what is possible in Lemma 1.
Corollary 1: When the relationship lender's need for liquidity is private information,
(i)  The loan will be liquid (with a zero illiquidity premium) under the conditions of Lemma
1 (i) and (ii).
(ii)  The loan will be illiquid, the illiquidity premium will be weakly higher, and the loan will
be sold in weakly fewer circumstances than under the conditions of Lemma 1 (iii).  There
will be no increase in liquidation relative to the case when the lender's type can be
directly contracted upon.
Proof :
Since the lender’s type is not observable, we have to add incentive compatibility constraints to




IIII VVVV +£+    (IC1: Incentive compatibility of type j=~I)
~~
1212
IIII VRVVRV +‡+            (IC2: Incentive compatibility for type j=I, if type I keeps loan)
~~
1212 ()
IIII VVRVRV +‡+ (IC3: Incentive compatibility of type j=I, if type I sells loan)
IC1 indicates the patient type must get (weakly) more in market value if she claims to be
patient. Therefore, an incentive compatible contract can, at best, pay both patient and impatient
types the same total market value. Liquidity insurance is thus ruled out for that would require the
impatient type to be paid more than 1 at date 1, and the patient type less than 1 in total. However,
fully liquid contracts are incentive compatible since they pay both types $ 1 at date 1.  Hence
Corollary 1 (i).
Self-selection for the impatient type (IC2 and IC3) can typically be achieved by back-
loading payments to the patient type and front loading payments to the impatient type. A
straightforward check of the various scenarios shows that IC2 (incentive compatibility for the
impatient lender when she keeps the loan) imposes no additional constraints on the optimal type-16
contingent payments but IC3 can in one situation. If the cash available to the impatient
relationship lender after a loan sale,  1 CS + , is small, the amount the patient type has to be paid
has to be disproportionately large to meet the IR constraint. The higher the probability of the
liquidity shock, the higher this amount. But then even if this amount is  backloaded, the impatient
lender may prefer it to receiving  1 CS + . Thus incentive compatibility may bind. In this case, we
get payments to be incentive compatible for the impatient type only by having her retain, rather
than sell, the loan at date 1. The set of parameters for which loans are designed to be sold is
smaller than in the full information case, and the illiquidity premium will be higher, because the
impatient type does not receive the proceeds from the loan sale at date 1. However, it is easily
shown that the lender can always be paid the additional premium, so liquidation does not
increase.   Q.E.D.
Finally, let us pinpoint the source of the illiquidity.
Corollary 2: If the maximum loan sale price, S, equals X2, the optimal contract will always be
liquid.






== . Thus the maximum that can be
paid at date 1 to the impatient lender in the absence of self-selection constraints is
1212 {{,},} MinMaxXXCX + . But this is also the maximum a patient lender can extract, so it
cannot be less than 1 for lending to occur. Self-selection constraints (Corollary 1) will limit the
amount paid to 1, hence the optimal contract will be liquid but will not provide insurance.
Q.E.D.
D. The Sources of Illiquidity.
Lemma 1 indicates that illiquidity  premia and liquidation arise even with optimal
contracts under perfect information because the entrepreneur cannot commit his human capital to
the project. Corollary 1 indicates that, in general, when the lender's liquidity shock is private17
information, the required illiquidity premium will increase. The optimal contract under private
information can, at best, provide full liquidity (zero illiquidity  premium) to the lender, but cannot
provide liquidity insurance (negative illiquidity premium).
As Corollary 2 indicates, the source of the illiquidity premium -- which leads to
liquidation and even denial of credit -- is that the maximum loan sale price,  S, is lower than the
present value of the amount obtainable by the patient relationship lender, X 2.  To see why this is
so, we consider two cases.
Case 1: Upon selling the loan, the relationship lender loses her liquidation skills and is not
available to collect at date 2.
The assumption here is that by selling the loan, the relationship lender loses contact with
the entrepreneur, and the business changes fast enough that she needs contact to keep her specific
liquidation skills honed. Alternatively, if the liquidity shock is a profitable opportunity that takes
the lender away from her existing ventures, it need not be the sale itself, but rather, the
refocusing on the new opportunity that destroys collection abilities. For example, consider a firm
offering trade credit. It can do so, in part, because it can repossess the goods it supplies and sell
them elsewhere. If the firm starts a new business and drops the old business, it will lose the
leverage it had with all those it had offered credit to.
5 With the relationship lender having lost her
skills, the loan buyer can extract a payment from the entrepreneur of, at maximum,  2 X b at date 2
where  1 b < .  So  2 SX b = . There is nothing the relationship lender can do to increase the sale
price above bX2, and lemma 1 then describes the best available financing outcomes.
Case 2: The relationship lender retains liquidation skills even after selling the loan and can
collect on the buyer's behalf at date 2.
                                                           
5 Note that according to this interpretation, the lender who chooses to retain the project loan and stay in the
old business does not have the time to fund the profitable new opportunity. This interpretation changes the
IR constraint if the loan is not sold. It is now
~~
1212 ()(1)()(1)
IIII VVVVR qqqq ++-+‡+- .  Qualitatively, the results are unchanged.18
 Case 2 is particularly appropriate if we think of the project’s characteristics as relatively
static, and the relationship lender as one whose primary business is lending (e.g., a financial
institution), and who acquires permanent liquidation skills relevant to the entrepreneur’s business
(such as knowledge of secondary markets for the borrower's assets) to extract payment.  This is
in contrast to case 1 where the liquidation skills are related to the lender’s business.
What would a buyer pay now for the loan at date 1, given that he can hire the
relationship lender to collect on his behalf at date 2? To determine this, suppose at date 2 the
entrepreneur tries to negotiate down the amount to be paid. The sequence of all such negotiations
will be as follows (see figure 3);  The entrepreneur will make an opening offer to the current
lender, in this case, the unskilled date-1 loan buyer. The buyer can accept the offer (in which
case the bargaining ends), or reject it in which case the offer is off the table. At this point, the
buyer can negotiate with the relationship lender about who will hear the last offer from the
entrepreneur and exercise control rights. After these negotiations, the entrepreneur makes his last
and final offer to whomsoever it is decided will respond, and the offer is either accepted, or
rejected and the project liquidated by the responder.
The negotiations between the loan buyer and the relationship lender take a simple form
(see figure 4). The relationship lender offers to take over the loan collection for a fee. If the offer
is rejected, it is the loan buyer who responds to the entrepreneur’s last offer; if accepted, the
relationship lender responds.
Even though the relationship lender still possesses specific skills at date 2, it turns out
that all the loan buyer will get at date 2 is  2 X b , so he will only pay S=  2 X b  at date 1. The
reason is instructive. Following backward induction, when the entrepreneur makes a final offer to
the buyer, he will offer to pay 2 X b  and the buyer cannot do better than accept. Folding back to
when the relationship lender makes her offer to the buyer, she will offer to pay  2 X b  from the
2 X she hopes to collect from the entrepreneur if chosen to respond to his last offer. Again,19
anticipating that he cannot do better by rejecting the offer, the buyer will accept.  Folding back
again, the entrepreneur’s opening offer to the buyer will be  2 X b  and the buyer will accept. The
relationship lender’s rents will be zero despite her retaining her skills.
 6
The relationship lender's skills do not get used despite her retaining them and being
better at collecting. Note that this is not a socially inefficient outcome, ex post, because all that
her skills are used for at date 2 is in forcing a transfer from the entrepreneur. The reason she does
not get a slice of the pie is that the buyer owns the loan and any control rights emanating from it,
so the buyer can, and does, conclude a deal with the entrepreneur without reference to the
relationship lender.
We thus come to the precise reason for illiquidity: If the loan buyer had the same skills
as the relationship lender, then 1 b =  and  2 SX =  in both cases. So a necessary condition for
both the illiquidity of the real asset (the project) and the financial asset (the loan) is specific
skills. In the case of the project, it is the entrepreneur's greater ability to run it relative to a
second best operator (as, for example, in  Shleifer and Vishny [1992]), in the case of the loan it is
the relationship lender's better ability to recover payments relative to someone who buys the
loan.
Case 2 highlights a further requirement: that the relationship lender not be able to
commit at date 1 to using her specific skills at date 2 on behalf of the loan buyer. In other words,
the loan is illiquid not just because the relationship lender’s human capital is specific but also
because she cannot explicitly commit to deploy it on behalf of others in the future.
E. An Example.
Let  1212 0.9,1.1,0,1.5,1.4,0.8. XXCCRS ======  Note that the date 1 cash
flow, C1, is zero in this example.  Because  12 [,]1.1 MaxXX= , the entrepreneur cannot commit
                                                           
6 The precise split of the surplus between the loan buyer and the relationship lender when they negotiate
does not alter this result, except if the loan buyer has all the bargaining power. In that case, the loan buyer
gets all the surplus from bargaining, and it is as if we are back in a world with full commitment.20
to paying more than $1.1 even though he generates $1.5 from the project.  Moreover, when hit by
a liquidity shock, the relationship lender gets more in present value by liquidating ( 1 0.9 X = )





When the probability of the liquidity shock,  q, is low, the relationship lender will sell the
loan when hit by the shock in preference to retaining it. We have 
~
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I VP = , where P2 is set to satisfy the lender's IR constraint, and will rise from 1 to 1.1 as  q
increases from 0 to 0.26. Since, the entrepreneur cannot commit to paying the relationship lender
more than P2=1.1, when q increases beyond 0.26, the only way the entrepreneur can satisfy the
lender's rationality condition is by allowing her to liquidate at date 1 and get 0.9 if she suffers the
shock. So if  q > 0.26, the entrepreneur will offer 
~
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I V = , and 
~
22
I VP = ,
where P2 is again set to satisfy the lender's IR constraint. Since liquidation generates more than a
loan sale, the relationship lender will again find it rational to lend for the range 0.26< q<0.42. But
when q>0.42, P2 exceeds 1.1 and is again not collectible. At this point, the probability of a
liquidity shock for the lender is so high that lending is not individually rational.
 We plot in figure 5, 
~
2
I V  (the date-2 payment required to be made by the entrepreneur)
and the expected net income for the entrepreneur, and in figure 6, the illiquidity premium. Both
the date-2 payment and the illiquidity premium rise with  q, fall discontinuously once the project
is liquidated, and rise again with  q until lending is infeasible. The entrepreneur's expected net
income falls initially with  q because he pays a higher illiquidity premium, falls discontinuously
once the project is liquidated conditional on a shock, and then falls again with  q not only because
of the rising illiquidity premium but also the increasing liquidation.
Finally, what is the interpretation of the contracts that implement the outcomes described
above?  When q<0.26, the contract is a standard long term debt contract, and the lender will sell21




I V that has to be repaid on the demand of the lender, and where the lender does not
get more than 
~
2
I V from the collateral if the assets are liquidated. If the lender gets a liquidity
shock, she demands immediate payment, and since this cannot be made in full, she liquidates.
Otherwise, she continues and accepts a payment of 
~
2
I V at date 2.
F. Summary.
If the relationship lender’s loan collection skills do not persist beyond her liquidity
shock, loans are unavoidably illiquid, with attendant consequences.  Even if these skills do
persist, however, the relationship lender cannot write explicit contracts committing to use her
skills on behalf of buyers.  This makes the loan illiquid if sold.  But could she somehow devise a
setting where she can effectively commit to use her skills to recover payments from the
entrepreneur and pass them on?
III. Financial Intermediation
We now argue that if the relationship lender “borrows against the loan” by setting up as a
financial intermediary with a fragile capital structure (one subject to a run), she can commit to
pass through everything she extracts from the entrepreneur. This allows her to  raise up to X2 at
date 1 from investors, which is the same as having S= X 2. As a result, the intermediary can drive
the illiquidity premium in the loans she makes to zero. Entrepreneurs will not have to suffer
liquidation, or be unable to borrow, simply because of the liquidity needs of the intermediary.
This is what we now show.
A. The Basic Argument
Suppose the loan made to the entrepreneur (henceforth "project loan") is in default at
date 2. What we showed in the previous section is that if the unskilled lender owns the project
loan and all the control rights associated with it, he can reach a deal directly with the
entrepreneur without the consent of the relationship lender.  The entrepreneur will pay  bX2,22
giving the relationship lender nothing.  By contrast, if the relationship lender's consent is
necessary to any overall agreement, for example if she owns the project loan, she can collect X 2
from the entrepreneur.  So if the relationship lender wanted to borrow from an unskilled lender at
date 1 (instead of selling the project loan), ideally she would retain ownership of the loan at date
2 and thus all rights to collect it so long as she makes a pre-specified payment, say X 2, to the
unskilled lender.
7  If a smaller payment were offered, the unskilled lender would have the right to
seize the project loan with the attendant loss of rents to the relationship lender.
Unfortunately this will not work. Before dealing with the entrepreneur at date 2, the
relationship lender can threaten to not collect the loan for the unskilled lender.  As in figure 4,
the single unskilled lender will accept an offer from the relationship lender, where the latter asks
to retain loan collection rights in return for making a payment of  bX2.
The role of demand deposits issued to multiple unskilled lenders (i.e., the fragile capital
structure) is to deter unskilled lenders from accepting such an offer.  The reason they refuse is
that they have the unilateral right to demand immediate payment of their full claim with
depositors being paid in the order they show up for payment, until the relationship lender has
nothing left.  Thus a subset of depositors can be made whole if they run to demand payment,
even when the collective cannot. Furthermore, in order to satisfy these depositors, the
relationship lender will either have to sell the project loan to raise cash to pay them or give them
the project loan (or fractional pieces thereof). In either case, the depositor run will transfer the
ownership of the project loan to the unskilled, with the attendant loss of rents to the relationship
lender. Anticipating the run and the loss of rents, the relationship lender will not attempt to
renegotiate, and can thus commit, by issuing demand deposits at date 1, to paying out up to X 2 at
date 2. Thus the role of the first-come, first-served constraint in demand deposits is to create a
collective action problem that forces a transfer of the ownership of the project loan whenever the
relationship lender attempts to renegotiate. Let us now elaborate.
                                                           
7 If weak preference is insufficient, then substitute, X 2-e, where e is an arbitrarily small rent that goes to the23
B. The Demand Deposit Contract.
Suppose at date 1 the relationship lender (henceforth called the "banker") borrows
against the project loan by issuing demand deposits to a large number, n, of unskilled lenders,
each depositing 1/n of the amount. Let P 2 be the amount owed at date 2 by the entrepreneur,
where P2£X2 without loss of generality.  If the banker can commit to pay this out to depositors,
the total promised to depositors will be  d2, which equals P2, and the amount promised each
depositor will be d 2/n. It will be convenient to think of values with the project loan as the unit, so
each depositor holds 1/n units.
A depositor who did not previously withdraw, and is not paid the promised amount on
demand, can withdraw if assets remain in the bank.  To be concrete, we assume that withdrawing
amounts to seizing financial assets (i.e., the project loan) with market value equal to the promised
amount of the deposit. We assume depositors seize assets though it is identical in outcomes to
depositors forcing the lender to sell assets and paying them the realized cash until they are made
whole.  Note that the market value of the project loan is 22 {,} MinPX b  if the entrepreneur has
not defaulted and  bX2 if he has. Once seized or sold, the ownership of the project loan transfers
away from the banker.  This effectively “disintermediates” the bank.
C. Negotiations with a Banker.
Suppose the banker tries to renegotiate deposit payments down at date 2 and makes  an
offer (see figure 7).  The banker’s threat to withdraw her human capital unless depositors accept
lower payment is non-trivial because the entrepreneur will be faced with unskilled lenders if the
banker does not provide her services, and he will pay less.
Each depositor must simultaneously choose whether to accept the banker's offer or to
withdraw.  By accepting the offer, the depositor forfeits his right to demand payment, and must
receive payments from bank assets that have not been seized by other depositors.  If the depositor
runs to withdraw, he will be paid so long as there are enough assets in the bank to pay all those
                                                                                                                                                                                 
relationship lender to make her strictly prefer honoring her commitments to having the loan seized.24
who demand payment. However, if the total promised payment to those who run exceeds the
market value of bank assets the bank's assets will have to be rationed.
Rationing takes the form of a first-come first-served mechanism. Those who run are






the defaulted project loan per unit held until the bank runs out of assets. A depositor’s right to his
share of the bank’s assets is ensured only when he physically withdraws it. The depositors who
run will thus get paid in full or get nothing except, perhaps, for one depositor who will get only a
fraction of his claim paid before the bank runs out. The banker cannot unilaterally prohibit
seizure implying she cannot suspend convertibility of deposits to cash.
After the banker and depositors have determined who holds the project loan (perhaps
through a run), the entrepreneur negotiates with the holder and makes the negotiated payment.
The sequence of events is as follows:
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
Banker makes offer to
depositors
Depositors either accept or
withdraw. If they withdraw, they
receive a random place in line if
rationed. Those who withdraw
seize assets with a market  value
equal to the face value of their
deposit.
Entrepreneur negotiates with
whoever holds loan (banker as in
figure 1 or, if disintermediated,
depositor or loan buyer as in
figure 3)
D. Response to the Banker's Offer to Negotiate.
Unless the market value of the bank's assets is sufficient to pay all depositors,  any offer
that the banker makes that imposes losses on depositors will lead to a run where all depositors
queue to demand payment. To see this, suppose that the entrepreneur has attempted to
renegotiate the loan and the banker offers depositors a net payment of 
'
22 dd £  per unit.
Following the notation in Diamond and Dybvig [1983 ], let f denote the fraction of depositors
who run to withdraw.  Each depositor gets d 2 per unit held if sufficient assets remain in the bank.25















, all the bank's assets will be seized, and depositors must be rationed based on
their (random) place in line.  Let  j f be the fraction of deposits withdrawn before depositor j.
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 The payoff from accepting the banker’s offer 
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2 d  must be paid from assets that remain
after depositors who run are paid off. So the payment to the depositors who do not run is
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b > , and the payoff from running is positive while that from accepting
the banker’s low offer is zero.   Therefore running is a dominant strategy since at best the
depositor will be at the head of the line and come out whole, while at worst he will be at the end
of the line and in the same position as if he had not run.
The payoff from running never exceeds  2 d  for all values of withdrawals, f. Therefore, if
at date 2, the banker commits to paying  d2, there will be no run.
8
                                                           
8 Because the banker can commit to d 2, and those who currently store can replace depositors who withdraw
their money, it is reasonable that there will be no panic-based runs.26
In fact, we prove a stronger result in the lemma. Suppose, as is more realistic, the first-
come first-served mechanism does not assign the project loan to depositors. Instead, it gives them
a position in a real queue in front of the bank window, where they have the right to seize assets
or waive their right when they reach the window, in response to fresh offers the banker may
make. If a depositor waives his rights, more depositors further back in line will be able to
withdraw.  Can the banker’s original offer of less than full value (that triggered the run), be
followed by a sequence of offers to those in line that persuades them to not seize assets? The
answer is no. If there is sufficient market value of assets in the bank to pay a given depositor's
claim in full, the depositor will make no concession -- he can simply withdraw and be made
whole. So long as there are depositors behind him who will not get paid in full, the depositor
cannot accept a promised payment out of future loan collections. A depositor further back in line
would seize the assets, leaving nothing for this depositor. As a result, any original offer that gives
depositors less than full value results in total disintermediation.
Once the bank is disintermediated by a run, the project loan is in other hands than the
banker’s.  Following the discussion in the previous section, the entrepreneur will make offers
that the new holders of the loan will accept without hiring the banker to collect. As a result, the
run drives the banker's payoff to zero. Anticipating this outcome, the banker will not try to
renegotiate the original deposit claims. Folding back to date 1, the banker can commit to pass
through the full amount that she can collect at date 2 from the entrepreneur to unskilled
depositors, and thus can raise d2 = P2 at date 1.
This argument is essentially a sketch of the proof that banks can create liquidity by
borrowing more than the market value of their illiquid loans.
Lemma 2: (i) If the number of depositors, n, is large enough, a banker gets a zero payoff from an
attempt to offer depositors less than full value d2/n per depositor at date 2. Even if n is small, the
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banker's payoff is bounded above by the rent that an intermediary could obtain in bilateral
negotiation with a single lender over collecting loans equal in market value to d2/n.
(ii) A bank can commit to pay out all that it can collect at date 2 by issuing demand
deposits to sufficiently many depositors such that the total promised payment equals the amount
that it can collect.
Proof: See appendix.
The lemma implies that if, at date 1, the entrepreneur offers to pay P 2=X2 at date 2, the
banker can immediately borrow S=X 2 against this promise by issuing demand deposits with face
value d2=X2. By Corollary 2, this implies the banker can make a loan to the entrepreneur at date 0
that entails no illiquidity premium, and that requires no liquidation. Thus the banker, by
committing her future collection skills using demand deposits, creates liquidity for the
entrepreneur.
E. More Generally.
Let us describe more generally what we have shown so far. Ownership of an asset is the
transferable right to make decisions on the use of the asset. Contracts are mechanisms that assign
ownership in a particular way, perhaps contingent on payments.
9 Each period, each contract can
be renegotiated.  Once there is an assignment of ownership in a period, the owner has the right to
make a decision about the use of the asset. We assume that while contracts assign ownership,
they cannot directly enforce decisions. In other words, after ownership is assigned, negotiations
also take place over the decisions that will be made. During the negotiations, the entrepreneur
and the relationship lender can commit to current payments and decisions, but not to future ones.
They can also reassign ownership, and write contracts over the future. Thus, every decision is
subject to negotiation.
                                                           
9 More generally, contracts only assign temporary claims on ownership , that is, they assign certain (and not
all) rights of ownership for a specific period. For example, having paid off this period’s interest, the
entrepreneur only has the right to operate his asset over the period. He does not have the right to sell it if
debt maturing in the future is secured by it. He also may lose ownership if he cannot pay future debt. None
of this is germane to the discussion at date 2, but it is important to qualify the term “ownership” if we28
When there is a single lender, negotiations over the assignment of ownership and
negotiations over decisions on the use of the asset collapse into one. When there are multiple
lenders, there are two sets of negotiations, one where ownership is assigned (who gets to bargain
with the entrepreneur) and one where decisions are made (is the asset liquidated or not).
It is easy then to see that a fragile capital structure, by itself, is insufficient to increase
the payment by the entrepreneur. Suppose the entrepreneur directly issues demand deposits –
where lenders establish ownership only by seizing the asset or a direct claim to it -- without
going through an intermediary.
 10  If the entrepreneur attempts to renegotiate, depositors will run
and some depositors will seize ownership of the asset. But once ownership is established over the
asset, the entrepreneur can ask each depositor not to liquidate in return for a per-unit payment of
bX2 , and they will accept. More generally, since ownership can only be assigned to unskilled
lenders, we have
Lemma 3: If  the entrepreneur borrows from unskilled lenders at date 1, he will pay only up to
bX2 at date 2.
This implies that a fragile capital structure by itself does not enhance the entrepreneur’s
ability to commit to pay.  Contrast this with a bank, which is a set of contracts where if the
entrepreneur commits to pay P 2, he owns the project.  If the entrepreneur does not commit to that
payment, and the relationship lender commits to pay d 2 per unit to each of many unskilled
lenders, then the relationship lender owns the project asset.  If neither makes a commitment, each
unskilled lender has the right to seize  2 d per unit he holds.  Even though contracts can be
renegotiated so the relationship lender can offer unskilled lenders a lower payment in return for
leaving ownership in her hands, unskilled lenders crucially suffer from a collective action
problem that deters them from accepting a low offer from the relationship lender. Therefore,  a
default by the relationship lender leads to a transfer of ownership to the unskilled lenders. It is
                                                                                                                                                                                 
discuss earlier periods.
10 Since we have assumed for simplicity that the physical asset is indivisible, depositors seize ownership29
the prospect of the actual transfer of ownership from the relationship lender to the unskilled
lenders in a bank that disciplines the relationship lender, and forces her to pay out up to X 2.
In summary, the problem of illiquidity cannot be solved solely by introducing a
collective action problem among the entrepreneur's creditors or solely by having a relationship
lender. Instead, it requires both.
F.  Liquidity creation for depositors over two periods.
Thus far, we have explained how a relationship lender can meet a need for liquidity at
date 1 by issuing demand deposits. But this suggests a more general point. The banker herself
may or may not need liquidity, but she can specialize in acquiring  relationship lending skills, and
can make potentially illiquid loans. She can meet the liquidity needs of her financiers by issuing
fresh demand deposits to replace any amount they may want to withdraw. This then suggests an
additional role for demand deposits. At date 0, the bank can rely exclusively on funding from
unskilled investors who may have privately observed and uncertain needs for liquidity at date 1,
decoupling the scale of the bank from the banker’s own wealth.  By issuing deposits to them,
which they can withdraw whenever they have a liquidity need, a bank can offer totally liquid
claims to investors despite funding loans that are illiquid. Thus deposit claims play a dual role in
a bank. They offer an ex ante assurance of liquidity to investors who may have a demand for  it,
and the first-come first served mechanism offers a practical way to meet unverifiable needs. Ex
post, the first come first-served mechanism enables the bank to actually provide this liquidity by
allowing the it to raise new deposits based on the implied commitment to pass through the value
it can extract. It is not inconceivable that the economic elegance of this mechanism explains its
historical persistence.
                                                                                                                                                                                 
certificates to portions of the asset.30
Specifically, the bank offers demand deposits with the option to withdraw d 1=1 at date 1
or d2=1 at date 2, per unit held.
11  This matches the returns and liquidity of storage and it satisfies
the incentive compatibility constraint imposed by the private information about the need for
liquidity.
 12   
Proposition 1:  A bank offering demand deposits to a sufficiently large number of depositors
with the following features:
(i)  the deposit contract promises equal amounts at both periods (d 1=d2=1)
(ii)  the depositors can seize financial assets of market value equal to the promised payment
on a first-come-first-served basis if the bank does not pay
will commit the banker to collect the loan on behalf of depositors; i.e., all cash flows extracted
by the bank from entrepreneurs can be paid out to depositors.  The deposits are liquid, although
they finance otherwise illiquid loans.
Proof: See Appendix.
Thus putting Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 together, the bank creates liquidity on both
sides of the balance sheet, shielding entrepreneurs from the liquidity needs of depositors, and
offering depositors a liquid claim even though they finance illiquid assets.
G. Alternative Assumptions on Bargaining.
Before we detail the implications, we should point out the bargaining games we have
assumed can be generalized without any qualitative change in the results. We have assumed that
each lender has no bargaining power and receives just his or her outside option, the liquidation
                                                           
11 In the Jacklin[1987] analysis of the Diamond and Dybvig [1983] model (also see Bhattacharya and Gale
[1987],  Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988] ), a result of this type would suggest that banks could not create
liquidity.  This is not the case in our model because the specific illiquidity of financial assets implies that a
bank can enhance liquidity without offering depositors a return that differs from market rates of return.
12 The one difference between date 2 and date 1 is that if the banker can set up a bank again after a run, the
entrepreneur may not be able to commit to pay depositors as much at date 1 as the banker can in the
aftermath of a run. If the entrepreneur calls for renegotiation at date 1 after the bank seeks to negotiate with
depositors, the entrepreneur would end up negotiating with the bank even if the bank is run, and would (at
best) gain nothing (see proof of proposition 1). Therefore, if the banker threatened not to use his skills on
behalf of the depositors at date 1, the entrepreneur would simply make the scheduled payment, and the
banker’s skills would not be needed.31
value.  In principle, we could allow each lender some bargaining power, and also allow for
different ways by which bargaining leads to a division of surplus.  All that is important for our
results is that the amount a borrower can commit to pay is an increasing function of the value the
lender can get from the collateral assets, which is true of both the commonly used outside option
bargaining and Nash bargaining solutions. All our results will go through (except in the non-
generic case where lenders have all the bargaining power--and take all surplus--in which case the
borrower's specific ability is not an issue) simply by replacing the payoff from rejecting an offer
with the payoff from the alternative bargaining game.
Similarly, the result that a run on a bank will result in full disintermediation is
independent of the bargaining game since it is the requirement that property rights be perfected
that makes depositors seize the loan or force its sale. Finally, the result that the banker's rents are
driven down when she is disintermediated depends primarily on the banker no longer having
control rights over the loan, rather than the sequence or structure of the bargaining. So long as
disintermediation changes the ownership of the loan, our results that runs can provide discipline
continue to hold.
IV.  Implications
Even though our model has looked at banks somewhat traditionally as making loans and
offering demand deposits, its implications hold more generally in distinguishing various kinds of
financial institutions today. Loans are a metaphor for positions (whether on- or off-balance sheet)
that are complex so that the bank’s skills are needed to manage them to maturity. Demand
deposits are a metaphor for guarantees of liquidity, whether they are loan commitments,
irrevocable letters of credit, or demand deposits. Our paper then says that the bank has a
comparative advantage in both holding complex positions  and offering guarantees of liquidity
because the guarantees pre-commit the bank to not absorbing too much of the rents created by its
ability to manage complex positions. The  complementarity is highest when the bank’s value32
addition is largely already embedded in its positions, and its skills are used mainly in effecting
transfers rather than in creating new value. The bank's rents are then most threatened by a run,
and it can thus enjoy cheap financing by issuing demandable claims.
  Let us now consider some
implications from the model.
A. Distinguishing Financial Institutions.
In relating the institutional structure of the bank to its function, our model also explains
how other kinds of financial intermediaries are different. Unlike commercial banks, money
market mutual funds do not create liquidity. In a money market mutual fund, each depositor has
the right to seize a proportion of assets equal to his proportion of total deposits. In other words,
depositor holdings are marked to market so the mutual fund is run proof. If indeed mutual fund
assets required active intervention by the fund manager, depositors would not be able to
discipline her, and the manager would capture a rent. Partly as a consequence, money market
funds avoid illiquid assets that have to be managed actively and hold liquid assets passively.
Money market mutual funds cannot create liquidity.  Depositors get liquidity simply because of
the underlying liquidity of the money market fund's holdings and not because the fund adds any
liquidity of its own.
Also, unlike commercial banks that provide liquidity on demand, insurance firms provide
large payments conditional on some observable and verifiable events such as death. Insurance
companies can provide considerable amounts of insurance -- their contracts correspond to those
that emerge from the mechanism design problem in Section II when liquidity needs are
observable. Banks, on the other hand, are limited to a milder form of insurance because the
liquidity demand they service is inherently unobservable or unverifiable.  Of course, some life
insurance companies have partly demandable claims that allow withdrawal of a fixed amount
even without the insurable event occurring (and runs do sometimes occur).  To the extent that33
they hold illiquid “relationship” assets, our ideas may be relevant to understanding such life
insurance contracts.
Commercial banks are different from investment banks because the latter’s value is
largely in future transactions rather than embedded in current positions. Venture capitalists also
play an extensive on-going managerial role in the start-ups they finance. Because investment
bankers and venture capitalists continue to provide valuable services after the initial financing,
they cannot efficiently be cut out of the deal. A coalition without the investment banker or
venture capitalist generates less total surplus.  As a result, demand deposits are unlikely to
provide discipline. This is a potential reason why the capital structure of investment banks and
venture capitalists is usually different from that of commercial banks. 
B. Narrow Banking, Bank Capital, and Deposit Insurance.
Our paper suggests that financial fragility built in through demand deposits allows the
bank to fund itself at low cost, disciplines bank rent extraction, and enables it to provide liquidity
to both depositors and borrowers. Our view contrasts with the more traditional view that
resurfaces every few years (e.g. Simons [1948], Bryan [1988]) that financial fragility is
unnecessary in banks and can be legislated away by requiring "narrow" banks, so that illiquid
assets are funded with long term liabilities and money raised from demand deposits is invested in
liquid paper.  Our model suggests that such legislation would kill bank liquidity creation, and
result in less credit being available to borrowers.
Of course, by only examining a world with no aggregate uncertainty, we have not
investigated the adverse consequences of financial fragility. When we introduce uncertainty, the
bank will be run and disintermediated in some circumstances when the project cash flows or
project loan values are too low. In deciding her capital structure, the banker now has to trade-off
liquidity creation against the cost of bank runs. It may be optimal for the bank to partly finance
itself with a softer claim like capital, which has the right to liquidate, but does not have a first-34
come-first-served right to cash flows (see Diamond and Rajan (2000a)). While this allows the
banker to extract some rents, thus reducing her ability to create liquidity, it also buffers the bank
better against shocks to asset values.  These ideas are also relevant to the discussion of whether
developing economies rely too heavily on short-term debt, see Diamond and Rajan (2000b).
What if the government insures private bank deposits?  Complete deposit insurance,
where all depositors are insured, will remove the commitment value of deposits.  Insured
depositors will not run, and there will be no threat of even partial disintermediation.   Unless the
deposit insurer has special negotiation or commitment skills, a fully insured bank does not create
liquidity (implying that if banks raise deposits in excess of the market value of loans, the excess
will be a subsidy provided by the deposit insurer). A fully insured bank has no more commitment
ability than an “all capital” bank: one where there is no collective action problem among claim
holders.
However, a less-than-fully insured system with some discretion in the ex-post
government guarantee of deposits may still provide commitment to bankers.  In practice, most
medium and large banks have many uninsured deposits or deposit-like liabilities, such as large
deposits, commercial paper, and inter-bank borrowing. Since runs by large creditors can bring
most banks down, the thrust of our results should hold. Moreover, if the insurer takes time
coming to the bank's aid, or is committed to punishing an undercapitalized a bank’s management
(perhaps by closing or merging the bank), we could get very similar effects to those in the model.
Seen in this light, legislative requirements that regulators take "prompt corrective action" when a
bank gets into trouble could improve the efficiency with which banks  intermediate credit, if they
succeed in making regulators play more of a disciplinary role.
For the threat of disintermediation to provide full commitment, all depositors must have
the option to withdraw (or at least enough depositors to fully  disintermediate the bank), and not
just those who need to withdraw for liquidity purposes.  This makes it difficult to use suspension35
of convertibility of deposits to cash to stabilize a bank.  If a bank can suspend convertibility of
deposits into cash at will, it cannot pay investors any more than an all-capital bank. This gives a
new perspective on suspension: it may be a transfer to the bank (effectively, a re-capitalization)
from depositors, who are now forced to negotiate.  Historically, however, banks were only
allowed to suspend convertibility when they agreed to do so as a collective, because the
borrowers in the region could not pay immediately, or because aggregate liquidity was scarce,
due to crop failure or panic.  This requirement of regional ( clearing house) agreement may serve
as a way of dealing with aggregate uncertainty (that is absent from our model but is present in
Diamond and Rajan (2000a)) without eliminating the commitment role of deposits for individual
banks.  More work is needed to examine the implications of this view of suspension.
IV.  Relationship to the Literature
It is useful to contrast our model with the existing literature to get a better understanding
of its contribution. Two aspects are particularly important -- how the model relates to other
papers explaining the structure of banks, and how it relates to other papers where short-term
creditors play a disciplinary role.
A. The Structure of Banks
A number of papers suggest a bank is an intermediary that structures its contracts to
minimize the risk it shares with outside investors when it possesses private information about the
value of its portfolio (for example, see Boyd and Prescott [1986], Diamond [1984] and Gorton
and Pennachi [1990]).  We show that a short-term non-renegotiable claim can be important even
without an uncertain portfolio value.
There could be other synergies between deposits and loans than the ones we focus on.
Flannery [1994] views the bank’s lending as inherently opaque and sees short term demand
deposits as the low cost way to prevent bank moral hazard. Bank capital structure is different
from that of firms in his model primarily because their moral hazard problems are worse. Myers36
and Rajan [1998] argue that too much asset liquidity can aggravate moral hazard problems, and
claim that, historically, the bank’s illiquid lending business arose to offset the inherent liquidity
of the assets it needed to hold to service deposit demand.  Kashyap, Rajan and Stein [1998]
suggest that because takedowns on various kinds of loan commitments occur in different states
than takedowns on deposits, the store of liquid assets held to meet liquidity demand  can be
optimally used. They thus find a synergy between loan commitments and deposits. Finally,
Nakamura [1988] argues the information from customer deposit accounts can be used by banks
to make better credit decisions while  Qi [1998] assumes that the information from credit
decisions helps depositors (who are also borrowers) evaluate the bank's competence. All these
potential synergies are clearly different from the one we model, but the theories are not mutually
inconsistent.
While some of these papers also emphasize the bank's role in lending to difficult credits ,
Diamond and Dybvig [1983] do not. They focus on the liquidity the bank provides depositors,
taking the illiquidity of real assets as given. We provide an alternative foundation, based on
illiquid financial assets, for the assumed illiquidity in their paper. In addition, the bank does more
than redistribute the returns from real assets across states and over time; it is also critical in
enhancing the returns from real assets over and above what would be available if investors tried
to manage them directly. Thus the institutional alternatives that  Jacklin [1986] proposes to a bank
would not be able to carry out the functions a bank performs in our model.
It is useful to contrast our notion of banks from the recent view put forward by
Holmström and Tirole [1997, 1998]. In their model, as in ours, firms may be liquidated or denied
funding because too small a fraction of their future returns can be paid to outsiders. In their
model, ex post unprofitable wealth transfers (provided by an explicit state contingent contract) to
these firms can help them survive. While individuals are assumed to not be able to commit to
honor promises to make the state contingent payments, an intermediary can hold collateral ex37
ante (though any source of ex post wealth would do) and thereby commit to making the
payments. The pooling of such asset holdings in an intermediary ensures that the collateral assets
are used optimally and not left idle ex post.
While the bank in our model also has a role in providing reliable funding (by providing
continuity and buffering the firm from the demands of direct investors), its value to firms comes
from the ability to make (or continue) loans that are unprofitable to others but privately
profitable. In a sense, the bank enhances the collateral value of the entrepreneur's date-2 asset
from  2 X b to  2 X and passes it through. The bank therefore does not merely utilize the economy's
collateral better but also enhances it. It provides liquidity because of its ex post ability, and not
because of its ex ante state contingent pledges.
B. The Role of Multiple Creditors and Short term Debt
Bolton and Scharfstein [1996] argue that multiple creditors can reduce the entrepreneur’s
incentive to default strategically because once an entrepreneur has reached agreement with one
creditor, he has a greater incentive to reach a deal with the second, and pays out more (also see
Gertner [1990]).  Bolton and Scharfstein assume a Shapley value outcome for bargaining, and
complementarity, between assets to establish this result. Under our assumption that the borrower
can make a take-it-or-leave it offer to every creditor, he will not lose bargaining power when
dealing with multiple creditors, even if assets are complementary, so their effects are not seen.
Berglof and Von Thadden [1994] rely on the inaccessibility of later creditors to construct
a staggered debt structure that will extract more from the entrepreneur. This will not work in our
framework because everyone is present to negotiate. As Lemma 3 indicates, no matter what a
firm's capital structure, it cannot pay unskilled lenders more than  2 X b at date 2.
This then points to an essential difference between our work and its closest counterpart:
Calomiris and Kahn [1991].  They describe demand deposits with sequential service as a way to
provide incentives for outside investors to monitor a borrower.  In their paper, depositors who are38
the first to withdraw their capital get paid in full, and will have an incentive to anticipate actions
of the borrower that would reduce the value of the borrower’s assets.  Their rush to withdraw
prevents a “crime in progress” from occurring and alerts passive outside investors that the
borrower will act against their interest. Because demand debt is used in their model when, at a
cost, one can predict value reducing self-interested actions of management, it should be as
effective in industrial firms as in banks. Our model, by contrast, emphasizes their special role in
bank liquidity creation.  In addition, we focus on the  ex-post disciplinary role of deposits in
disintermediating the banker whenever some asset losses are revealed or anticipated.  In this
view, unlike in  Calomiris and Kahn, depositors are not required to undertake detailed monitoring
of the bank to anticipate future problems.  They need only commit to a sufficiently harsh
punishment once problems are revealed.  While both roles may be important, ours is more
relevant if depositors do not get much more than public information by monitoring or if the
punishment provided to bankers by depositors also punishes depositors.
V. Conclusion.
When a lender makes loans that can be collected only with her specific collection skills, the loans
are illiquid. This is because the lender’s specialized human capital cannot be easily committed to
collecting the loans hence they will sell at a discount, or will be poor collateral. Mechanisms that
commit the lender to collecting the loans create liquidity. A bank is structured to be such a
mechanism. If the lender finances using demand deposits, she cannot hold up depositors and,
instead, has to pay them the promised amount. Intuitively, the sequential service constraint
creates a collective action problem among depositors, which makes them run on the bank
whenever they think their claim is in danger. When the bank has the right quantity of deposits
outstanding, any attempt by the banker to extort a rent from depositors by threatening to withhold
her specific collection abilities will be met by a run, which disintermediates the banker and39
drives her rents to zero. Thus the banker will not attempt to extort rents, and can commit her
human capital to collecting the loans.
An important contribution of this paper is  to tie the notion of illiquidity of financial
assets to the specific skills a lender may have. These skills may have to do with the knowledge
the lender acquires about a particular borrower or with expertise acquired by repeated interaction
with a certain class of borrower or with a certain type of contract. If these skills are not widely
available, the lender's financial assets are illiquid, with attendant consequences to the borrower.
This notion of illiquidity could be useful in other contexts also.
We have largely focussed on situations where the lender's acquired lending skills persist
even after a liquidity shock. The lender we have in mind in this situation is a specialized
financial intermediary whose main line of business before and after the shock is likely to be
credit. In fact, we also examine situations where such a relationship lender need not get a shock
of her own but creates liquidity for other who do.
In addition, however, we have explored situations reminiscent of trade credit, where a
firm in a business has an advantage in lending to buyers because it can sell repossessed goods
better. It will lose this advantage if it gets a shock that forces it to leave the business. One
example of such a shock is an adverse one like bankruptcy. In these situations, we have two
possibilities. Those who have obtained credit may stop repaying the firm because it has little
ability to sell what it repossesses. The outstanding credit will not come down quickly for such a
distressed firm, and we will have the seemingly paradoxical situation of the distressed financing
others. Alternatively the firm may be forced to liquidate credits because it has little extraction
ability in the future. In either case, realizations will be low when the firm is distressed , implying
the illiquidity premium associated with trade credit (and other business to business credit) should
be high.40
Our simple model can be enriched in a number of other directions to provide more policy
implications. One obvious direction is to introduce uncertainty about asset values, which will
create a role for bank capital (see Diamond and Rajan (2000a)). Another is to explore what
would happen if there were an aggregate shortage of liquidity. This could introduce a role for
bank reserves, which is absent in our model thus far. Preliminary work indicates that an
investigation along these lines could help identify a set of policies to deal with financial crises
that seem far more nuanced that the conventional wisdom. One could go on, but this should be
enough to suggest there is much to be done.41
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2:
The argument in the text uses functions that implicitly require depositors to be small. Nothing
depends on this, however, and if depositors decide simultaneously whether to run, then any offer
from the banker seeking concessions will lead to a run (with full disintermediation and f=1).  We
now generalize this. The banker can make an initial offer. If the offer is for less then d 2 per unit,
a run will start (using the same logic as in the text), and each deposit will be assigned a place in
line. We now allow the banker to make a second offer to each depositor as the depositor comes
up to the bank to withdraw based on his place in line. If the banker makes an offer that deters a
given depositor from withdrawing (seizing or forcing sale of loans), then the loan will remain in
the bank for possible seizure or forced sale by a depositor behind him in line, who has not yet
reached an agreement.
The banker must offer each depositor his out side option given the number of loans
remaining in the bank that have not yet been seized or sold.  The outside option is the smaller of
the full value of the deposit and the market value of the remaining loans.  If a fraction  j f  of
deposits have withdrawn before depositor j arrives to withdraw 
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, the outside option per unit
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Any offer that the banker makes must be payable using assets that remain in the bank
after all depositors in line have had the chance to withdraw.  Consequently, the outside option is
non-increasing function of place in line. If any depositor is to make a concession, the last in line
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withdraw, since their outside option to take assets is worth d 2/n. Let  m be the number of42
depositors who can withdraw in full. The total units of loan seized or sold to meet the needs of
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operator that gives the smallest integer greater than the argument.
Once  m depositors have withdrawn, the banker can ask the next depositor, for whom
there are not enough assets to be made whole, to make a concession. But in order for this
depositor to leave the remaining assets in the bank, the bank should be able to convince
depositors who follow him not to withdraw. All these depositors should be paid at least the
market value of the collateral that is left (since that is their outside option). The total that can be
paid to all non-withdrawing depositors, even with the banker’s superior collection skills, is 1/ b
times the market of the value of the assets remaining at the end of the line.  So at most 1/ b




integer less than or equal to 1/ b.  Then for the banker to convince the remaining depositors not to














--£ . Since the left hand side is increasing in  n, there is an n
* such that the
bank is fully disintermediated if  n>n
*. Even if the bank is not fully disintermediated, the banker’s
rent is small because the bank’s remaining assets have a market value of less than the amount of
one depositor’s deposit.  The rent is at most the amount of added value that the banker can
collect from one depositor:  1 b -  times the full value of the assets remaining in the bank after
the run (and less when there is more than one depositor at the end of the line who does not
withdraw and must be paid by the banker).  Q.E.D.43
Proof of  Proposition 1: The entrepreneur offers the bank the lowest cost loan contract that will
induce the bank to make the loan, and we prove below that the bank can pass through all that it
collects to depositors.  As a result, the bank will break even on its lending, and collect a total
market value of payments from the entrepreneur of 1, offering depositors the chance to withdraw
for 1 at date 1 or 2 (d1=d2=1).  No matter what is the fraction,  q, of its depositors who will
withdraw for liquidity purposes at date 1, the bank can meet the withdrawal because there is no
aggregate liquidity shortage: there is storage in use from date 1 to 2 after all profitable projects
have been funded.  Either the bank can borrow 1+ q units at date 0, and store q in cash until date
1, or it can borrow 1 unit at date 0 and issue new deposits of  q at date 1 to finance withdrawals.
It is also clear that if the bank does not meet the depositor demand, or is anticipated not to meet
demand, it will precipitate a run on the assets.  All that remains to be shown is that the bank
prefers to make pre-committed payments rather than trying to renegotiate and precipitating a run.
We know from lemma 2 that the bank is disintermediated and gets zero rents if it tries to
renegotiate at date 2.  So it will prefer to make pre-committed payments, and can commit to pass
through all date-2 collections to depositors.
Similarly, if the banker should seek concessions from depositors at date 1, a run will
start.  This follows because d1=d2, and even a depositor who otherwise planned to hold until date
2 would seek to seize assets at date 1 by running.  Following the logic used in proving lemma 2,
all depositors will run.   The consequences of a run at date 1 are only a little more complicated
than at date 2. Assume first that the banker cannot re-establish a liability structure with demand
deposits immediately after a run. In the aftermath of a run at date 1, if the depositors and the
entrepreneur have a first chance to reach a deal (before depositors negotiate with the bank at date
1), the depositors have the option to hire the bank at date 2.  The entrepreneur can make current
payments up to C1 and can commit to make date 2 payments equal to what depositors can enforce
on their own. Since this is also equal to the greatest amount that the bank can commit to pay44
them without re-establishing the bank, the depositor will, in fact, deal directly with the
entrepreneur, the banker will be  dis-intermediated after a date 1 run, and will extract a zero rent.
Thus the banker will not want to precipitate a run by demanding to renegotiate what she owes
depositors.
If instead the banker could reestablish the demand deposit structure after a date 1 run,
she could commit to pay depositors up to the amount the bank itself can collect at date 2. This is
more than the entrepreneur can unilaterally commit to pay at date 2. If so, it is possible that the
entrepreneur may not be able to commit to pay depositors as much at date 1 as the banker can in
the aftermath of a run. If the entrepreneur calls for renegotiation at date 1 after the bank seeks to
negotiate with depositors, the entrepreneur would end up negotiating with the bank, and would
(at best) gain nothing.
13 Therefore, if the banker threatened not to use her skills on behalf of the
depositors at date 1, the entrepreneur would simply make the scheduled payment, and the
banker’s skills would not be needed.  As a result, the banker’s threat to not negotiate at date 1
would not cause the value of bank assets to fall, and no run would occur.
So depending on our assumption, the banker’s threat to withdraw her human capital at
date 1 unless depositors make a concession either precipitates a run and she is disintermediated,
or does not precipitate a run, but the threat has no bite since the entrepreneur makes scheduled
payments.  Q.E.D.
                                                           
13 This assumes that the loan contract need not be renegotiated if the banker is there to negotiate.  We know
that there exists a renegotiation-proof loan contract between the entrepreneur and the bank, conditional on
the entrepreneur and the bank being the parties who negotiate, if the bank can commit to pay all collected
funds to depositors: this is the contract from lemma 1 with S=X 2.45
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Figure 1
Bargaining at date 2 between a relationship lender and
entrepreneur
Entrepreneur offers an alternative current payment, 
'
22 PP < .
He will supply current human capital and make the alternative





222 (,) CPP - .
Relationship lender rejects, liquidates for  2 X .
Payoff of Entrepreneur, Relationship lender  2 (0,) X .
Outcome: Entrepreneur offers 
'
22 PX = if  22 PX >  and relationship lender accepts.   If instead
the lender is an unskilled lender and can liquidate for  bX2, rejecting the offer leads to payoffs to
the entrepreneur, and unskilled lender of  2 (0,) X b respectively.  In this case the entrepreneur
offers 
'
22 PX b = if  22 PX b >  and unskilled lender accepts .F2
Figure 2
Bargaining at date 1 between a
patient relationship lender and
entrepreneur
Entrepreneur offers an alternative
current payment 
'
1 P  and date 2
renegotiation-proof payment 
'
2 P . He
will supply current human capital and
make the alternative current payment



















Lender rejects the offer and current
cash is not produced. Lender retains
liquidation rights to liquidate for X 2
Negotiations begin again at date 2,
see figure 1. Payoff of Entrepreneur,
relationship lender:  222 (,) CXX - .
 Lender rejects the offer, liquidates
for X1. This destroys all future
output and gives a zero payoff to
entrepreneur.  Payoff of
Entrepreneur, relationship lender:
1 (0,) X .
Outcome: Entrepreneur offers 
''
1212 max{,} PPXX += if  1212 max{,} PPXX +> .  If the
lender is unskilled on both dates, replace  12 max{,} XX  with  12 max{,} XX b .  This figure
does not apply if the relationship lender gets a liquidity shock; see the discussion in the text.F3
Figure 3.
Bargaining at date 2 between the entrepreneur (E) and an unskilled lender (U) who owns the loan,
when there is a relationship lender with persistent loan collection skills .
E offers 
'




222 (,0,) CPP -
U rejects and negotiates with R
about who will negotiate with  E
as in figure 4.
Payoffs (E,R,U)=
2222 (,(1),) CXXX bb --
(see figure 4).
Outcome:  Entrepreneur offers 
'
22 PX b = and unskilled lender accepts.F4
Figure 4.
 Bargaining at date 2 between the relationship lender (R) and the unskilled lender (U) over who will
collect payment from the entrepreneur (E).
 R offers a net payment 
'
2 P  (equal to a fee
of
'
22 XP - ) to U, committing not to represent U
in negotiation with E if rejected.
 U accepts
R negotiates with E as in
figure 1, and makes net
payment to U.
Payoff s( R, U)=
''
222 (,) XPP -
 U rejects
U negotiates directly with E as
in figure 1.
Payoffs( R, U)= 2 (0,) X b
Outcome: The relationship lender will offer 
'
22 PX b = , and the unskilled lender will accept.F5


















Region of Liquidation               Region of No Lending No Liquidation, only premium
q , the probability of a liquidity
shock.F6
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q , The probability of a liquidty shock
Illiquidity Premium
The illiquidity premium is defined in the text and is in units of output
(not percent).
The face value is V2
~I (see proof of Lemma 2) while the entrepreneur’s
net income is given by the objective function in the entrepreneur’s
maximization problem (see proof of Lemma 2). Both values are in units
of output.F7
Figure 7. Depositors (D) response to banker’s (B) offer of d2`<d2
B offers D d2`<d2
D rejects, joins a bank run
(simultaneously with other depositors) to
seize specified amount of loans and
negotiate directly with entrepreneur.
Expected depositor payoff from run (per unit
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where f is the fraction of depositors that run.
The run:
D learns place in line
D rejects, does not join a bank run
and enters into negotiation with B
about who will negotiate loans that
remain in the bank after completion of
run by other depositors. D’s payoff
per unit deposited is bounded above
by () f bl  (where  () f l is defined








Depositors ahead in line seize all
bank assets, D gets a zero payoff.
                 D rejects
Enters into negotiation with B about
who will negotiate with entrepreneur
(see figure 4). Payoffs (E, B,D)
= 2222 (,(1),) CXXX bb --
D accepts, does not join a bank run, and
receives payment from portion of loan
that remains in the bank after
completion of run by other depositors.
B negotiates the portion of the loan left
after run with E.
D payoff per unit deposited is
'
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Assets still in the bank when D
reaches front of line, D seizes
assets worth d2 per unit held.
E makes an offer to D.
D accepts
Payoffs (E, B, D) =
222 (,0,) CXX bb -
The payoffs are for a depositor if  a fraction f of depositors run.  The tree assumes that there are an infinite
number of small depositors (for simplicity), but the proof of Lemma 2 covers the finite depositor case.